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The Reservation Wage of Unemployed Persons in the Federal Republic
of Germany: Theory and Empirical Tests
ABSTRACT
This study examines the determinants of the reservation wage of
unemployed persons in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1976. The
theoretical section presents the derivation of an optimal reservation
wage and shows the source of an ambiguity of some explanatory variables.
The data basis are unemployed persons leaving the unemployment register
within a given sample week. For a subset of them, we know their reserva-
tion wage and a set of personal characteristics. Other variables, such
as the wage offer distribution and demand side variables, are obtained
by employing other data. Methodological probems, such as as a sample
selection bias, are taken into account. As a result, individual charac-
teristics and the wage offer distribution are dominant causes of the
reservation wage, but demand side variables and the entitlement to





Federal Republic of GermanyZusammenfassung
Der Beitrag untersucht Bestimmungsgrunde dessog. "Anspruchslohns"
Arbeitsioser in der Bundesrepubljk Deutschland imJahre 1976.
Trotz einer Vielzahl ausgefejiterArbeitsplatzsuchmodelle mui?
sich die Studje auf einigehauptsächljche Uberlegungen beschrinken..
well die durch die Theorievorgegebenen Variablen datenmäl3ig
noch nicht zur VerfUgung stehen. Da nicht alleArbeitsiose die
entsprechenden Einkommensangaben gemacht haben, muIgeprUft werden,
ob und inwieweit die Schàitzergebnisseaufgrund dieser fehienden
Information verzerrt sind. Eine diesbezUglicheKorrektur wurde
vorgenoen, Als Ergebnjs zeigt sich eine Dominanz derindividuellen
Merkmale und der Vertei].ungsfunktjonder Lohnangebote für den Er-
klärungswert des Anspruchslohns,wohingegen unterschiedliche kon-
junkturelle EinflUsse oder dieAnspruchsberechtigung auf Arbeits-
losenge].d nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen.The place of economic theory is to be
the servant of applied economics.
John R. Hicks (1938)
INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the reservation wage of unemployed persons to the
amount of which the duration of unemployment has often been attributed. An
unemployed person searching for a job classifies all job offers in two exclusive
classes: acceptable and unacceptable. The wage which separates these two
classes is called the reservation wage. Hence, a job offer lower than the
reservation wage is not accepted and vice versa.
This study is an attempt to narrow the gap between theoretical and
empirical work on job search behaviour partly by examining the determinants of
the reservation wage specified by job search models. The basis of the empirical
reserachis unemployed persons leaving the unemployment register within a
givensample week. For a subset of these unemployed persons we know the wage
they want to receive, and a set of personal characteristics. Other variables
such as the wage offer distribution and demand side variables are obtained by
employingother data. Some serious methodological problems must be taken into
account such as theproblem of non—randomly missing data, for example.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a very brief cxitline
of a theory concerning the determinants of the reservation wage. Since this
section does not intend to present a survey on job search models, no claim
is made that the conclusions reported there are an exhaustive picture. A short
description of the data and discussion of methodological problems is contained
in Section II. Enpirical results and their interpretation are reported in
Section III, and a conclusion including some policy implications is given finally.—2--
Onegeneralcaveat seemsnecessarywhich will not be repeated again. A
review of the literature on job search models sometimes gives the impression
that reluctant unemployed persons with too high reservationwages have replaced
the unemployed breadwinner of the family as the focus of concern about jobless-
ness. We therefore want to emphasize thatsearchunemployment is only one part,
and perhaps a minor part, of unemployment. To see this, note that job search
theories usually assume thatthereis at least one job offer in a given time
period. But there may be a considerable amount of unemployed persons who do
not receive a job offer at all within a reasonable time period due to bad
demand conditions, for example. Since many wages are negotiated and fixed,
therefore, and employers for good economic reasons refuse to hire overqualified
workers, a substantial reduction in the reservation wage and/or a search for
a less qualified occupation may not help for those unemployed. To call them
voluntary unemployed seems more to explain the problem away rather than to
explain the facts.
I. THEORY
In their simplest version, job search models postulate that an indivi—
dual maximizes expected wealth if he or she accepts a wage offer (combined with
a job offer) which is not lower than his reservation wage. Let wR denote the
reservation wage and f(w) the known distribution of wage offers. The probability
of receiving a job offer q depends on personal characteristics and demand side
variables denoted by z and on the wage rate. w is a determinant ofq for
several reasons. First, holding capital costs constant the higher thewage rate
the more likely the firmwillswitch to capital goods instead of using labor
and, hence, the smaller the probability to receive a job offer at all.
Second, wage rate offered may be more associated with the job than with
the applicant. The higher the wage rate the longer the queue of applicants for—3—
this job who will be offered the job due to higher abilities and who will
accept it. This again implies a decreasing chance for a given searcher to
get a job offer, i.e., 6q/6w <0.Thus the probability of receiving and
accepting a job offer p in any period is given by
(1.1) p(z,WR) =q(z,w)f(w)dw
Although the individual's abilities are assumed to be invariant during the
search process, there is a distribution of wage offers since prospectiveem-
ployers do not value them equally. The individual contacts several employers
submitting different job offers. The distribution of job offers is the source
of uncertainty: although its parameters are known to the searcher, each offer
is a realization of a random variable.
The present value of earnings from an expected accepted job offer is:
(1.2) E(wlw>wR)= w•q (z,w) f (w)dwlp (z,wR)
where the right hand side is the conditional mean of w given that w >R.
infinite time horizon is assumed, hence r is the constant discount rate. In
thefinite horizon case l/r is the present value at time 0 of one unit nominal





whereT is the finite time horizon and i is the discount rate.-
The reservation wage is optimal if the present value of accepting the
reservation wage equals the present value of the gain from continuing search.




The expected net worth from continuing search until receiving a wage
offer equal to or better than w' consists of the unemployment compensation u
and of the expected future wage (conditional on WR) provided that a job offer
with a wage equal to or better than is received and accepted.








2+ p(z,wR)E(wIwwR)} (third period)
(l+r) t=3 (l+r)
The terms containing u can be rearranged to (where p =p(z,wR)):
(I.5a)u[l + (l—r) + (1—p)2 2+ •• r
(l+r)




and after some manipulation we can write the terms containing E(wlw>w') as:








Hence the net worth (1.5) can be written as:
u(l+r) R R l+r
(1.6) R+ p(z,w )E(wlw>w ) R
r+p(z,w ) r(r+p(z,w))





R r'u + p(z,wR) E (wlw￿wR)
r+p (z ,w')
Equation (I.7a) already reveals some interesting properties of the
reservation wage. An increasing unemployment compensation implies a higher
reservation wage since the costs of search become lower. Increasing the mean
of the probability distribution of wage offers has the same effect, On the
other hand, a lower probability of receiving and accepting a job offer, due
to poor personal characteristics or bad demand conditions, tends to reduce the
reservation wage. Finally, the search process can be viewed as an investment
decision negatively related to the rate of discount.
If search costs c (c=constant) are introduced,--' the expression (I.7a)
changes to:
R R
(1.8) wR =ru+p(z,w).E(w w￿w )— r'c
r+p (z
or
R 1 R R R
(I.8a)w —u=— p(z,w )[E(wlw>w)— wI— c,
which corresponds with the result stated In recent studies on job search.--"
Inserting the integral of equation (1.4) into equation (I.8a) and determining
the parameters and the form of the wage distribution gives a solution for—6—
w' (if it exists):
R
(1.9)w =g[f(w),r, c, u, z]
An infinite time horizon, a known distribution of wages, and constant
costs of sampling imply a constant reservation wage over time ceteris paribus.
This may, however, be an oversimplification. Several hypotheses have been
offered to justify a changing reservation wage over time.
(i) If a finite time horizon (the retirement age, for example)-7-"
is introduced, a longer search duration may still lead to a
higher job offer, but as a contrary effect the remaining time
in the labor force becomes shorter. Hence, due to wealth
considerations the reservation wage may decline with duration.-'
(ii) If the individual is not or no longer entitled to unemployment
compensation, he or she may reduce the reservation wage in
order to become employed and thus be entitled to unemployment
compensation later (agaln).2." Or, to put it differently, in an
unemployment insurance system with a finite duration of unemploy-
ment compensation payment an Increase in these benefits leads to
a reduction in the proportion of long—term unemployed (or other
non or no longer entitled unemployed such as youths, for example)
and to an increase in the proportion of short—term unemployment.
The result that the reservation wage increases (decreases) for
increasing unemployment payments only for those unemployed who
are entitled (not entitled) to it rests, however, on a positive
probability that unemployed workers will be laid off later.
As has been shown by K. Burdett (1979), in the case of a zero
probability of lay off the reservation wage remains unaffected by—7—
a change in the unemployment insurance system for those not or
no longer entitled to it since the expected pay off to accepting
a job will not change. In the German system, an example for this
type of job is employment in the public sector.
(iii) If the distribution of job offers in unknown, the reservation wage
may be a function of the searcher's beliefs. It changes according
to the revisions the individual makes in the light of his experi—
ence.-' In thecase of an overestimated mean of the wage distri-
bution, there may be a decreasing reservation wage and vice versa.
(iv) As has been mentioned in (iii), a further complication is the
possibility of being laid off. The job search theory's explanation
may be called in question if the tenure of jobs is rather short.
Given that possible brevity of tenure in some jobs, an unemployed
may raise his total return from search by accepting less attractive
jobs from the beginning.--1
(v) Finally, another reason why optimal reservation wages may decline
over time has been explored by introducing risk aversion into the
model. Assume that the individual maximizes the expected utility
of lifetime consumption (instead of the present value of income
net of search costs, as assumed in most job search models).--"
The utility function may indicate decreasing absolute risk
aversion.--1 Since wealth decreasesduring the search process due
to search costs and because the expected working life shortens, it
follows that risk aversion increases and hence the reservation
wagedeclines.--' Risk aversioncan be influenced not only by
wealth considerations, but also by personal characteristics such—8—
as age or marital status, for example. A married searcher who
is the breadwinner for his family may be more risk averse than a
single one.
Especially, the assumption of a known wage distribution is one of the
most heroic theoretical assumptions of job search models and the most crucial
step in the empirical test of these hypotheses. Even if we assume that a
known wage distribution is sufficiently characterized by its first and second
moment, problems arise the to an ambiguity of some effects. Although a higher
mean for the wage distribution increases the reservation wage and hence the
search duration,--1 this is not necessarily true with respect to an increase
of the variance of the wage distribution. As Figure 1 shows, a higher
variability in the wage offer distribution increases the probability of
receiving a job offer which is greater than the reservation wage only if
R R w =
w2
,or,to put it differently, if the reservation wage is higher than
the mean of the wage distribution)' In the case that the reservation wage
coincides with the mean of the wage distribution, the reservation wage remains
unaffected if the variance of the wage distributions changes. Hence, only a
comparison of the means of both wage distributions with the reservation wage
can determine the effect of a higher variance of the wage distribution theore-
tically to be expected.
The data which will be examined more carefully in the next section
prohibit us from considering more than just the mean w and the standard
deviation a of wages in the profession to which the individual belongs.












with z again denoting personal characteristics and demand side variables and
u denoting whether or not the individual is entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion. There is no information contained in the data about the amount of the
unemployment compensation. The variables c and r have been dropped due to a
lack of data. Since variables and their definitions are dictated by the data
set, we are fully aware of the fact that we cannot present a neat and illuminat-
ing test of all implications of job search theory concerning the reservation wage.
II. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC PROBLEMS
Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the data, a short
description may be in order.
The sample contains all unemployed persons who left the unemployment
register in approximately the last week of September 1976. Since the unemploy-
ment register includes only unemployed registered at the labor office, the
sample may not be representative f or all unemployed. The personal characteris-
tics are reported for the most recent spell of unemployment and include among
others age, sex, profession, marital status, citizenship, health condition,
school education, vocational training, work experience, type of job contract
termination (quitting, laid off, etc.), number and result of job offers given
by the labor office, number and duration of all unemployment spells since 1973.
No explicit information is available on whether the individual is entitled to
unemployment compensation. We can, however, construct a proxy using the
information about the individual's previous work history. As has been noted,
the sample includes only unemployed leaving the unemployment register. Hence,
we are able to circumvent a major problem associated with data on persons
being unemployed at a given survey data. Such data are subject to a length—
bias since the probability to be in the survey is greater the longer the dura-
tion of unemployment.--7' Moreover, standard results of the theory of stochastic—11—
processes show that if we can assume that the unemployment spells are running
long enough, the structure of our sample is equivalent to the structure of all
unemployed persons starting their unemployment spell within a given time
period. Duetothis advantage our data may outperform a data set on all un-
employed persons even if the latter would have been available to us.
Nevertheless, the data used herein suffer from deficiencies. A major
disadvantage is that all information concerning the reservation wage is given
at the very beginning of the unemployment spell. Revisions, if any, are not
reported. Hence, we are not able to test whether the reservation wage is
influenced by the duration of the current spell of unemployment. However, the
dependence on the duration and number of previous spells may be analyzed.
After eliminating some obviously incorrectly coded cases, about 6600
unemployed persons are contained in the sample. However, for only about
1100 persons is information about the desired income available. Some cases
also report different dimensions about income (hourly, weekly, monthly, yearly
wage rate). Since we do not know both the exact desired work time, we included
only those cases where monthly wage rates are available. After correcting for
some dubious cases, we finally obtain a sample size of 952 persons.-'
Since not all unemployed report their desired wage rate the question must
be raised as to whether the missing answers are random or non—randomly missing
data. For example, people with high desired income (compared with their previous
income) may be less willing to answer this question since they fear that the
labor office may not consider them to be at its disposal and refuse to pay
unemployment compensation. It might be better to refuse to answer than to give
a wrong answer (that means a lower wage rate than desired), since if the labor
office offers a job combined with this incorrect wage rate a rejection may also
lead to a disentitlement to unemployment compensation payments.—12—
The effect of non—randomly missing data on the estimatedparameters can
be evaluated)! Let D be a dummy variable whichequals one if the unemployed
person gives the information about the desired income and which is zero
otherwise, and let Z be a vector of explanatory variables of this choice to
answer or not to answer. An answer is given when Z and a randomcomponent
u1 together exceed some threshold value.-1
(11.1)D =1if Z ct +u1 >0
D=O if Zc+u1<O
Further, let V be a vector of the explanatory variables of the reservationwage:
(11.2)
R= + u2
For notational convenience we drop the subscript i referring to the i—th
individual. We only observe if D =1.Hence:
(11.3)E(wRIV, Z, and D =1)=V+ E(u2IV, Z, and D =1)
21/ Integrating out V yields:—
(11.4)E(wRIV, Z, and D =1)=V+ 12 a2/a1 E(u2IZ, and D =1)
where a bivariate normal distribution foru1 and u2 is assumed with mean zero,
variances and a, and correlation
p12.
As can be seen, as long as there is a correlation between the residuals of
the choice to answer —functionand the reservation wage equation the least
squares coefficients of the subsample are not consistent estimators ofbecause:
(11.5)E(w'IV, Z, and D =1)V—13—
As has been shown by J.J. Heckman (1976), this expression can be trans-
formed to:
(11.6) E(wRIV, Zct/a1, D =1)=V+ p12a2 M (Za/a1)
where
f (Za/a)
(11.7) M (Zc/a1) =
F(Zo/a1)
is the inverse of the so called "Mills'—ratio" and f(S) and F(S) denote the
distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of
respectively. The derivative of M with respect to Zc/a1 is positive, hence
the greater Za/a1 the more important is the bias.
A consistent estimate of can be obtained by applying the probit
method using the dummy variable D as a function of the variables Z. We then
can evaluate M explicitly for each individual using the estimated Z/
Next, we estimate equation (11.6) by ordinary least squares. As has been
shown by J.J. Heckman (1976) this procedure will yield consistent (but not
fully efficient) estimates of .Note,however, that the formula for standard
errors for least squares coefficients understate the true standard error and
overstate estimated significanceleve1s.--"
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The estimation procedure is carried out in two steps.
(i) We first check for omitted variable bias. Applying the probit
method we estimate the probability of "having the information"
and calculate the inverse of the Mills' ratio.
(ii) We then estimate the regressions on the reservation wage according
to the considerations of the theoretical section.—14—
To begin with, Table 1 presents the probit estimates-p' of "having the
data on Incomes" CD =1)or not (D =0).The independent variables need some
comments. The variable "work experience" perhaps should capture better Inf or—
mation on the wage offer distribution if the individual has worked before.
A similar effect is attributed to the variable "position before becoming
unemployed"; compared to white—collar workers, a blue—collar worker may not
undertake much search efforts. Besides this, blue—collar workers include
temporary workers with no clear idea of their reservation wage and those tempo-
rary workers who take whatever job they can get. Twice the log likelihood
(negatively) gives 176.568 —indicatingthat the null hypothesis of insigni-
ficance of all parameters can be rejected.' Since the probit model is based
on the cumulative normal probability function, the question may be raised as to
whether the results are an artifact of the distribution. As has been shown by
D.R. Cox, for example, the numerical difference between a probit and a logit
model-' isvery small over the entire range of both distribution functions
with the only exception at their extremes. We want to point out, however,
that other possibilities such as angular transformations are not considered in
this paper.
In the next step, the Mills' ratio is evaluated for each Individual using
the parameter estimates of the probit method. This procedure ensures that
we will obtain consistent estimates of the parameters if the inverse of it is
added as an independent variable to the regression equation on the reservation
wage.
As has already been pointed out in the theoretical section, independent
variables and their definitions are dictated by the data set. In addition, some
efforts have been made to enrich the list of variables by constructing
variables such as entitlement to unemployment compensation, for example, and—15—
Table 1: Probit Estimates of' the Probability whether


































by including variables from other statistics such as demand side variables
and wage offer distributions.-" Any variable that was in the data set and
was thought to reflect the individual's search strategy is included in the
regression. Not all observed variables, however, can be derived directly and
explicitly from search theory, but serve merely as proxies for unobserved
variables such as discount rates and the degree of risk aversion. The difficulty
is due to the identification problems which cloud the issues. For illustration,
consider age as one of the explanatory variables.-' The theoretical upshot
of this variable is ambiguous since it may reflect a shorter remaining working
life, a lower discount rate, or a greater variance in the offer distribution
(not adequately taken into account by the construction of this distribution).
Column 1 of Table 2 lists the coefficients of regression on the log of
the reservation wage and Table 3 presents a list of symbols and definitions
of variables. The logarithm of has been chosen since test for normality-'
did reveal that the null hypothesis of non—normality could be rejected at a
higher significance level for in .Thevalue of the log likelihood function
and the standard error of the regression are reported at the bottom of each
column. "t"—values are in brackets but recall that they understate the true
standard error in the case of sample selection bias. Column 2 reports the
beta coefficients in order to compare the magnitude of the influence of each
29/ variable.—
The higher the mean of the wage offer distribution the individual is facing,
the higher the reservation wage. This theoretical argument is confirmed by
the estimates, the elasticity of the reservation wage with respect to the mean
of the wage offer distribution is 0.27. The effect of the standard deviation of
the wage offer is theoretically ambiguous, depending on whether or not the
reservation wage is higher than the mean of the wage offer distribution. Since—17—
Table 2: Regrc:;sion Results
Independent Beta R H Variables in w Coefficients w in w
for (1)
_________________—(i) (3) (11) ciiii
in [ in (3)] 1 0.270 0.176 0.353 0.883 0.295
(5.6) (7.3) (95.2) (6.0)
in a [a in (3)] 2-0.057 -0.0142 -0.102 0.o51' W W (13) (1.2) (1.3)
ABILITIES 3 0.150 0.221 225.535 0.1140 O.l91
(7.8) (6.7) (6.6) (10.8)
ENTITLEMENT 14 0.031 0.0143 116.825 0.057 0.032
(1.7) (1.5) (2.8) (1.7)
AGE 5 0.013 o.116.14 1.9.363 0.013 0.0111
(10.5) (9.1) (9.5) (10.7)
SEX 6 0.236 0.353 371.801 0.183 0.198
(12.7) (11.6) (9.0) (11.1)
MARITAL 7 0.316 0.508 11142.216 0.3014 0.319
(6.6) (5.2) (5.6) (6.5)
HEALTH 8 0.086 0.101 152.981 0.093 0.083
(11.0) (14.0) (3.9) (3.8)
UR 9-0.023 —0.038 —23.696 -o.oi11
(1.6) (0.9) (0.9)
INTERACTION 1 10-0.001 -0.1511 -1.7117 -0.001 -0.001
(6.3)
.(5.8) (11.0) (6.11)
INTERACTION 2 11-0.008—0.14911 —10.565 —0.009 -0.008
(5.11) (11.1) (5.0) (5.14)
12 0.351 0.212 1509.1110 0.268
(6.1) (6.2) (2.0)




hood Function -53.622 - -7058.590-59.593 —314.83
SSE
. 0.230 5110.897 0.259 0.235
952 952 952 952—18—
Table_3:Listof Symbols
ABILITIES =1ifminimum requirements for school educa—
tion, vocational training, and work experience
according to the occupation are fulfilled,
o otherwise
AGE age
ENTITLEMENT 1 if entitled for unemployment compensation,
•o otherwise
-
HEALTH 1 if no restrictions concerning health con-
dition, o if there are restrictions
INTERACTION 1 =bivariateinteraction term between AGE and
UP
INTERACTION 2 bivariate interaction term between AGE and
• MARITAL
M Nillsratio
MARITAL 1 if married, o otherwise
SEX 1 if male, o otherwise
SSE =standarderror of the regression
UR aggregate unemployment rate at the beginning
of the recent spell of unemployment
UP number of previous spells of unemployment
mean and standard deviation of the wage offer
distribution the individual is facing (di—
vided by boo)
reservation wage—19--
both means are approximately equal,-1 there should be no important effect of
on w'. This is confirmed by the low significance level and the low value of
the beta coefficient of the a variable. Note, however, that no claim is made w
that the wage offer distribution used in this study gives a realisticpicture
since only a distinction with respect to profession is made. As aconsequence,
the influence of many independent variables is partly due to omitted hetero-
geneity of the wage offer distribution. Moreover, long—term unemployed may
not have the choice over the entire distribution but only over the lower left
area of the distribution due to missing work experience, for example. Both
higher abilities and the entitlement to unemployment compensation unambiguously
increase the reservation wage on theoretical grounds. The empirical results
support this hypothesis, but the importance of the entitlement is rather low.
Therefore, this study gives no basis for an empirical justification of sub-
stantially higher reservation wages of insured, unemployed people. Note, however,
that only the fact--" of whether the individual is or is not entitled could be
included and not the amount of the unemployment compensation. Sex seems to be
an important variable (with regard to the beta—coefficient) indicating an
unequal (reservation) wage structure to the disadvantage of female unemployed
32/ persons. —
Althoughan interaction term between SEX and ABILITIES was insignificant
at the 5% level, the suspicion may be raised that the higher reservation wage
of male unemployed persons is due to a higher proportion of better educated and
trained men with more work experience than women entering the labor force
after a period of non—market activities.
Restricitions with respect to health conditions have a negative impact on
the reservation wage too. More surprisingly, demand conditions —representedby
the overall unemployment rate —seemto have a rather low influence on the—20—
amountof the reservation wage. Although there is some variability in the
unemployment rate due to different durations of unemployment the significance
of the coefficient of thisvariable is rather low. Perhaps onereason for this
result is that regional unemployment rates are a much better indicator of the
demand conditions the individual is facing. But the data set does notgive any
information about the residence of the unemployed person.
The impacts of age and marital status on the reservationwage are related
due to the interaction term. The effect of age depends on the marital status
and the number of previous spells of unemployment. More precisely, if no
previous spells of unemployment occur, the effect of age on the reservation
wage is always positive, but lower for married unemployed persons. To state
it theoretically, although a higher age results in a lower remaining working
life, this negative effect on the reservation wage is offset by the higher
reservation wage due to the expectation that the employer will value a longer
work experience. In the case the individual is married, however, thisage
effect is lowered because the search costs are higher. The opportunity costs
are greater for a married searcher due to higher net incomes not earned while
unemployed which may outweigh higher unemployment compensation for married
unemployed.Besides this a married unemployed may be more risk averse than a
single one if he is the breadwinner of the family. As has been shown in the
theoretical section, risk aversion leads to a lower reservation wage. Conse-
quently,the effect of the marital status on the reservation wage is negative,
but only if the individual is older than38 years. Ifthe individual is
younger,a married, unemployed person has a higher reservation wage than a
singleone. The reason for this may be that the spouse is working and that
the higher unemployment compensation for married unemployedoutweighs the
effectof risk aversion mentioned above. During this age the difference
between net incomes is smaller due to lower gross incomes and the progressive—21—
tax system, but there may be a greater relative difference in gross incomes
between young married and non—married persons-p' since the employer often
takes into account the number of dependents when offering a wage to a younger
married applicant. Since the searcher knows or expects this behaviour he
raises his reservation wage. Besides this, the effect of more risk aversion
for married persons does not play an important role for young couples if both
are working and/or supported by their parents.
One major disadvantage of the data set is that it does not allow us to
test the hypothesis of a declining reservation wage while unemployed. The
only possibility is to take into account the amount of previous spells of
unemployment. We want to stress, however, that this variable is a rather
crude proxy only. Although the variable UP significantly enters the regression
equation as an interaction term with ACE, a main effect of UP has not been
significant at even low standards. Excluding the main effect violates the
hierarchicalstructure of the model" and implies a so—called "synergistic"
model.--'The interpretation is that if theage variable is low, the number
ofprevious spells of unemployment does not have an important effect on the
reservation wage. Virtually no teenager entering working life has previous
spells of unemployment. As the regression results and the beta coefficient
indicatethe magnitude of the impact of the UP variable (in connection with the
AGE variable) is not very impressive. Thus, there is no strong evidence that
previous spells of unemployment play more than a lower—order role. Although
this result cannot be transferred to the impact of the duration of the current
spellof unemployment without several caveats, the suspicion may be raised that
the reservation wage will not be influenced very much by the individual unemploy—
36/ ment experience.—
More tecimical isssues of the estimates are discussed next. Inorder to
make sure that the results are not an artifact of the logarithmic specification—22—
ofw', w, and column(3)of Table 2 presents an estimation using non—
logarithmic values of these variables and where all other variables retain
their prior meaning. As can be seen, the signs of the variables do not change
and beta coefficients (not reported again) do not indicate a change in the
importance of a variable. The significance level of the UR variable, however,
is reduced substantially. In order to check for normality of the dependent
variables ln and R, a test whether this assumption can be rejected is in
order. Such a test can be performed by testing the normality of the error
terms.Thechosen test is the SRAPIRO—WILK test-a' since it is specifically
designed for a Gaussian null hypothesis and therefore its power characteristics
indicate that it usually will outperform other tests.-' The calculated
Shapiro—Wilk statistic is 0.9978 and 0.9732 for the logarithmic and the non—
logarithmicversion. The critical values above which the hypothesis of non—
normality canbe rejected are 0.991 and 0.985at 1% and 10% respectively.
Hence, the null hypothesis of non—normality can be rejected for the logarithmic
value but not for the non—logarithmic value at conventional significance levels.
Although the interceptis significant at a rather high level one might be
temptedto analyze to what extent itincorporates effects attributed to the
other concomitant variables of the equation. As it is wellknown fromthe
39/ R
analysis of covariance— the intercept is the general mean of ln w plus the
mean of the continuous variables multiplied by their regression coefficients.
R
To put It differently, the intercept can be interpreted as the mean of ln w
if the continuous concomitant variables are measured as deviations from their
means. In non—logarithmic values, the Intercept (121)is 8 p.c. of the
geometric mean of wR (7.350ln 1555). As column 4 shows,--' the major effect
of estimating a homogeneous regression is the increase of the regression
coefficient of ln w and M' and the insignificance of ln 0w and UR. Since
job search theory usually provides no basis for whether or not an intercept—23—
should be included, it is reassuring that this does notsubstantially affect
the magnitude of the coefficients of other economic variables with theexception
of that of in w. Hence, we may conclude that the constant term contributesa
—-l R major share of the influence of in w and N on in w
In order to test for a sample selection bias more generally, column (5)
presents the regression equation of column (1) without the M1 term. Although
there is no substantial change in the value of the parameters, some coefficients
are subject to a sample selection bias. This bias results in an overestimation
of the influence of abilities, but underestimates the effect ofsex. Twice the
difference in the log—likelihoods strongly exceeds the critical X2(l) =3.84.
Hence, we can reject the hypothesis of no sample selection bias. The source
of this bias can be detected by evaluating the correlation between the residuals
of the in equation and those of the probit specification,
p12.
As has been mentioned in the methodological section, the coefficient of the
N1 term equals
p12 02 The variance is downward biased, howver, but
it can consistently be estimated
N ...'N
-.2=- Eu —b2E N.1 (Z. —NT1) 2N. 1 . i.ii 1=1 i=l
where b is the regression coefficient of M1. From this procedure we obtain
estimates p120.788 and a2 =0.455.Compared with the rather minor change
in the parameter values between column (1) and column (5), a correlation
coefficient p =0.621between the residuals seems to be a little too high.
Note, however, that is subject to a standard error (which has not been
derived explicitly yet). In fact, other studies show-' that this approach
may slightly overshoot the adjustment for selectivity bias compared with joint
maximum—likelihood estimates ofp12, a2, and the regressioncoefficients.---'—24—
IV. CONCLUSIONANDPOLICYIMPLICATIONS
This study represents a start on empirical work on the reservation wage
of unemployed persons in Germany. The advantage of this analysis is that it
allows us to estimate the reservation wage as long as some basic individual
characteristics are available.
With respect to policy implications two major issues should be pointed out.
First, there is a positive effect of the entitlement to unemployment compensa-
tion on the reservation wage and, hence, on the duration of unemployment. But
this influence is rather small. Therefore, this study does not provide a basis
for proposals to change the unemployment insurance system. Second, higher
abilities lead to a higher reservation wage. This result may outweigh the
effect that higher abilities raise the probability that the individual receives a
job offer. As a consequence, the duration of unemployment may be longer for
those individuals with a better education and/or vocational training. A policy
which improves the educational level of unemployed is of course recommendable
since it reduces the risk to become unemployed but the policy maker should
keep in mind that this measure is not necessarily an employment policy in
the sense that it reduces the duration of unemployment directly.
Many variables of search models are difficult to observe and the theory
itself contains rather sophisticated behavioral relationships. In order to
come into contact with empirical phenomena, it has been necessary to withdraw
from the burden of high—powered theory. Hence, a further piece of research
needed in job search models is to provide a more sound empirical basis than
is available to us. For example, panel data on unemployed persons of short
subsequent time periods would allow us to more explicitly test the hypothesis
of a decreasing reservation wage while unemployed. Questions about the wage
offer distribution would give some insights as to whether or not the indivi-
dual has sufficient information about it.—25—
Obviously, much more work needs to be done. The goal to be capable of
answering some more questions about labor market behaviour is worthy of
further efforts. It might then be the appropriate time to decide to what
extent job search models describe reality or are fine arts of economic
theory.—26—
FOOTNOTES
1/ For recent surveys, see H. Knig (1979), S. Lippman and J. McCall (1976),
and K.W. Rothschild (1979), for example.
2/ See S. Nickell (1979), P. 1251.
3/ See N. Kiefer and G. Neumann (l979a), p. 91.
4/ Although the following results are standard in job search models we present
the derivation at some length since their explanation is sometimes rather
cursory. For an exception, see J. Addison and W. Siebert (1979), p. 197.
5/ For a discussion of search costs and the duration of unemployment see
W. Mellow (1978) who uses the residuals from a hedonic wage regression as
a measure of search costs. For a distinction of how much time and money is
devoted to job search, see J.M. Barron and W. Mellow (1979).
6/ For examples, see N. Kiefer and G. Neumann (1979) and S. Nickell (1979).
7/ For retirement considerations see R.H. Gordon and A.S. Blinder (1980).
8/ See R. Gronau (1971). For the effect of initial wealth endowment, see
J.P. Danforth (1979).
9/ See D. Mortensen (1977), W. Franz (1979). In an empirical study for Sweden,
A. Bj3rklund (1978) obtains a negative sign of the unemployment insurance
variable in a logit approach of survival rates of unemployed.
10/ See M. Rothschild (1974) for a derivation of this result and M.G. Kohn and
S. Shavell (1974) for a discussion of the effects of different beliefs about
the wage offer distribution.
11/ See K.B. Clark and L.H. Summers (1979) on this point also. For effects of
introducing the probability of being recalled by the employer in the case of
a temporary lay off, see J.M. Barron and W. Mellow (1979).
12/ We note parenthetically that the difference between maximizing either the
expected utility of the present value of income (net of search costs) or the
expected utility of lifetime consumption is of some importance. If the direct
utility function, for example, is non—linear in consumption, the conditions
which allow income to be included as the sole argument in a direct utility
function do not necessarily hold. For a discussion of why these conditions
are violated see M. Spence and R. Zeckhauser (1972) and J.P. Danforth (1977).
13/ This can be achieved by definingr —U" (x)/U'(x) as a measure of absolute
risk aversion when the utility function is U(x). Ifr is a falling function
of wealth, the searcher's risk aversion increases as wealth declines. See
J.R. Hall, S.A. Lippman and J.J. McCall (1979), and D.C. Nachman (1975).—27—
14/ See also K.P. Classen (1979).
15/ See equation (I.7a). See also N.M. Kiefer and G.R. Neumann (1979a) for a
discussion.
16/ For a formal derivation of this result see H. Knig (1979), M. Rothschild (1974),
and M.G. Kohn and S. Shavell (1974), for example.
17/ See S.W. Salant (1977).
18/ We do not report numerous difficulties with the data. Due to a strange coding
each individual had to checked for plausibility.
19/ Since the following considerations are standard results we only present the
main results. For an extensive treatment see, for example, J.J. Heckman (1976)
and Z. Griliches, B.H. Hall, and J.A. Hausman (1978).
20/ This threshold can be assumed to be zero withoutany loss of generality.
21/ See Z. Griliches, B.H. Hall and J.A. Hausman (1978, p. 144).
22/ See J.J. Heckman (1979), pp. 158—160.
23/ Since probit analysis is standard in modern econometric textbooks, the reader
is referred to H. Theil (1971), pp. 630—631, and R.S. Pindyck and D.L. Rubinfeld
(1976), pp. 245—247.
24/ Given a 0.0005 p.c. significance limit, the critical value above which the null
hypothesis can be rejected is 17.730 for 3 degrees of freedom.
25/ D.R. Cox (1970), pp. 27—28.
26/ A description of the wage offer distribution is contained in an appendix
available on request. To summarize shortly, the mean and variance of wages
are taken from a 1% census in 1976. The data basis is monthly net income
distinguishing several professions.
27/ See K.P. Classen (1979), p. 201 for this point.
28/ See also p. 22.
29/ Beta coefficients are defined as the estimated parameter value of each inde-
pendent variable multiplied by the ratio of the standard error of this variable
and the standard error of the dependent variable. For a discussion,
see D.J. Algner (1971), pp. 72—80, for example.
R —. 30/The mean of ln w and ln w is 7.349 and 7.403, respectively.
31/ Which is an estimate itself.
32/ For a study of determinants of the reservation wage of mature women see
S.H. Sandell (1980).—28--
33/ In the public sector, for instance, there is a difference in incomes between
married and not married employees regardless of their age.
34/ The requirement of a hierarchical structure is important in the context of
loglinear models. See S.E. Fienberg (1977), p. 39.
35/ For an example see Y.M.M. Bishop, S.E. Fienberg, and P.W. Holland (1975),
p. 112.
36/ Empirical work by H. Saterdag (1975) which is based on interviews, shows that
unemployed people were somewhat unwilling to accept a lower income in order
to receive a new job, although their willingness increased a little with a
longer duration of unemployment.
37/ For a description including tables see S.S. Shapiro and M.B. Wilk (1965).
The observations have been grouped into 50 groups.
38/ For a discussion of this point, see E.F. Fama and R. Roll (1971).
39/ See H. Scheff (1959), pp. 194—195 for a proof. For a basic introduction to
variance and covariance analysis, see H.J. Schalk (1975).
40/ R2 has been dropped since its interpretation becomes difficult in a homogeneous
regression. In this. case the ratio of the sum of squares of the regression to
the total sum of squares can exceed the 0,1—interval. For more details, see
D. Aigner (1971), pp. 85—90.
41/ is the variance of the residuals of the in wR equation.
42/ See J.J. Heckman (1979), p. 157 (the above formula is corrected for print
errors).
43/ See Z. Griliches, B. Hall and J.A. Hausman (1978), p. 147.
44/ Which are much more elaborate but do not result in a large gain of efficiency.—29—
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